Introduction
A major motivation for the introduction of default inheritance mechanisms into theories of lexical organisation has been to account for the prevalence of the family of phenomena variously described as blocking (Arono , 1976:43) , the elsewhere condition (Kiparsky, 1973) , or preemption by synonymy (Clark & Clark, 1979:798) . In we argued that productive processes of sense extension also undergo the same process, suggesting that an integrated account of lexical semantic and morphological processes must allow for blocking. In this paper, we review extant accounts which follow from theories of lexical organisation based on default inheritance, such as Paradigmatic Morphology (Calder, 1989) , datr (Evans & Gazdar, 1989) , elu (Russell et al., 1991, in press ), Word Grammar (Hudson, 1990; Fraser & Hudson, 1992) , or the lkb (Copestake 1992 ; this volume; Copestake et al., in press) . We argue that these theories fail to capture the full complexity of even the simplest cases of blocking and sketch a more adequate framework, based on a nonmonotonic logic that incorporates more powerful mechanisms for resolving con ict among defeasible knowledge resources (Commonsense Entailment, Asher & Morreau, 1991) . Finally, we explore the similarities and di erences between various phenomena which have been intuitively felt to be cases of blocking within this formal framework, and discuss the manner in which such processes might interact with more general interpretative strategies during language comprehension. Our presentation is necessarily brief and rather informal; we are primarily concerned to point out the potential advantages using a more expressive default logic for remedying some of the inadequacies of current theories of lexical description.
Data
The type of phenomenon which is typically discussed under the rubric of blocking involves in ectional morphological irregularities; for example, the past participle of walk is walked and we can describe this regular morphological operation (roughly) in terms of a rule of concatenation hstemi+ed 1 . However, this rule should not be applied either to non-verbal stems (e.g. beast, *beasted) or to the subset of verbal stems which exhibit irregular behaviour (e.g. sink, sunk, *sinked; bring, brought, *bringed; make, made, *maked). These observations are captured in default inheritance based approaches to the lexicon by specifying that the rule in question applies to the subclass of verb stems, but allowing subclasses of this class to override its application (where in the limit a subclass may consist of a speci c word). Thus, the rule is interpreted as a default within a class and more speci c subclasses can prevent its application via stipulative statements. In the case where a rule does not apply to a subclass or single member of the class over which it is de ned the rule is said to be blocked. There are cases though, where both a morphologically irregular and regular form coexist, so that blocking cannot be treated as an absolute property of lexical organisation (e.g. dream, dreamt, dreamed; burn, burnt, burned) . Proposals for accounting for such exceptions to blocking have not treated blocking itself as a default, but have either, in e ect, denied that any such general principle is at work in the lexicon by stipulating its e ect on a wordby-word basis (Fraser & Hudson, 1992) or treated those verbs which allow both irregular and irregular forms as a further subclass of`dual-class' verbs which specify an irregular variant but also inherit the regular pattern (Russell et al., 1991) . Even in the clear cases of blocking the productive forms surface as common errors in the language of rst and second language learners and, though we may not be happy to accept sleeped as a word of English, we are able to interpret utterances such as I sleeped well with considerably more ease than many other forms of putative ungrammaticality.
Blocking is not restricted to in ectional morphology, but appears to be pervasive throughout the lexicon: we can see its e ects in derivational morphology, conversion and metonymic processes of sense extension. It appears to account for some of the semi-productivity of most synchronic, generative lexical rules (see Bauer, 1983 :84f for a discussion of other factors restricting productivity). However, blocking rarely if ever appears to be an absolute constraint on word (sense) formation. For example, there is a derivational rule of noun formation from adjectives by su xation of +ity (e.g. curious, curiosity; grammatical, grammaticality). This rule is generally blocked by the existence of a non-derived synonymous noun (e.g. glorious, glory, *gloriousity; tropical, tropic(s), *tropicality). The similar rule of noun formation from adjectives by su xation of +ness is apparently not blocked or not blocked to the same extent under these circumstances (e.g. ?curiousness, ?grammaticalness, ?gloriousness, ?tropicalness). Nevertheless, there is a sense of markedness or awkwardness about such examples which is not present with forms which do not undergo noun formation with +ity or compete with a non-derived synonymous form (e.g. awkwardness, markedness, weakness, kindness). Arono (1976) argues that noun formation with +ness, in contrast to +ity, is fully productive, hence the lack of blocking with +ness forms. This account does not address the di erence in acceptability between those +ness forms which are preempted by a synonymous underived form or one formed with +ity.
In general, even clearly productive derivational rules can be, at least partially, blocked. Rappaport & Levin (1990) argue convincingly that noun formation via su xation with +er on verbs is highly productive and creates a meaning change where the derived noun denotes the class of objects which can serve as the verb's subject (or external argument in their terminology). Thus teacher denotes the agent of teach, whilst opener can denote the agent or more usually instrument of open. Bolinger (1975:109) cites stealer as an example of a form blocked by thief. In fact, stealer is fairly clearly blocked in contexts where its meaning is synonymous with thief, but may be used in contexts where its productively derived meaning has been specialised or modi ed; for example, Bauer (1983:87-8) points out that stealer can be used metonymically as in Shakespeare's the ten stealers ( ngers) or when the denotation is restricted via mention of the object (e.g. stealer of hearts / fast sports cars).
Nominalisation with +er also illustrates another apparent type of blocking which cannot be described as preemption by synonymy but which can be characterised as preemption by equality at some level of representation. Rappaport & Levin (1990) point out that the class of words which allow middle formation (e.g. John stuck the poster (to the wall), The poster stuck easily (to the wall)) tend to form nominalisations with +er which denote stereotypical objects, rather than subjects (e.g. sticker, broiler, bestseller) 2 . It is di cult for these nominalisations to also denote subjects and, where this can be forced, the meaning is inherently specialised; for example, sticker can be used to refer to a person who is determined, as in He is a sticker when it comes to crosswords, but is very odd in ?He works as a sticker of posters. Productive nominalisation with +er can also be blocked by the existence of a non-productive sense of the derived form; for example, stationer means a person who sells stationary and not a person who stations, say, troops, and banker (at Barclays) refers to a person who works in a (senior) position in a bank, and not to one who banks his money there. In these cases, what is blocked is generation of an orthographically or phonologically identical word form with the productive meaning associated with the relevant derivational rule. In addition to rules of derivation there are similarly productive processes of conversion and sense extension which also appear to be subject to blocking. In and we argued in detail that derivation, coercion and sense extension should be treated within the same general framework. Conversion processes are often highly productive as the host of noun-verb conversions such as hoover illustrate. However, derived forms such as arrival do not undergo this process because of the existence of arrive. , and Ostler & Atkins (1991) argue that metonymic and metaphorical processes of sense extension must be treated as lexical rules which can undergo blocking; for example, the productive sense extension of`grinding' (see e.g. Pelletier & Schubert, 1986) , whereby a count noun denoting an individuated object becomes a mass noun denoting a substance derived from that object, when applied to animals typically denotes the meat or edible esh of that animal (e.g. lamb, haddock, rabbit). However, this process is blocked by the existence of a synonymous form (e.g. pork, pig; beef, cow). In these cases, blocking does not prevent the more general process of grinding but makes the typical interpretation highly marked.
It seems that blocking is pervasive, or at least that use of the term in the literature is pervasive. However, all the cases we have considered appear to share some properties: blocking itself is rarely if ever absolute, and blocking is preemption of rule application by equality at some level of lexical representation. In what follows, we explore the hypothesis that a uniform account of blocking can be provided which subsumes both the morphological and lexical semantic cases.
Inadequacies of Current Approaches
Extant accounts of blocking in recent theories of lexical organisation based on default inheritance have mostly treated blocking as an absolute principle of lexical organisation. That is, if some derivational behaviour is given for a class, specifying some distinct behaviour for a subclass always has the e ect of preventing the more general behaviour from applying. The sole exception that we are aware of is the theory of Word Grammar (Hudson, 1990; Fraser & Hudson, 1992) which treats blocking as the exception rather than the rule. Thus, in Word Grammar, by default, the lexical rules speci ed for a class apply to all subclasses, even those that have been stated to have exceptional behaviour | the more speci c information augments, rather than overrides, the more general information. This approach would be natural if it were the case that the lexicon appeared to tolerate the rule-governed production of synonymous or homophonous words, but the cases considered in x2 suggest that this is not so. As a result, it is necessary to stipulate that blocking does occur with forms such as sleeped, whilst cases like dreamed or curiousness are predicted to be the norm rather than the exception. At the very least, this obliges the lexicographer to include many idiosyncratic exception statements in a lexical description (e.g. Cahill, 1992) . In addition, there are theoretical reasons for believing blocking to be a general principle of lexical organisation: a lexicon which did not impose some such constraint would be in danger of becoming dysfunctional with language change and development, resulting in too many distinct word forms conveying the same meaning or too many distinct meanings associated with homophonous forms.
All other theories of lexical organisation which account for blocking impose it as an absolute principle. We will illustrate some approaches to blocking within default inheritance based accounts by discussing how in ectional morphology may be described within the lkb system and compare this to some other formalisms, concentrating on those which are similar to the lkb, in that lexical information is represented as feature structures (fss). The lkb, in e ect, incorporates two inheritance mechanisms | the type system, based on Carpenter (1992), enforces constraints on fss which cannot be overridden, and psorts provide a default inheritance mechanism. Psorts are named fss which are used in the lkb description language in a manner similar to the use of templates in patr-II. Psorts may be speci cally de ned, or be ordinary lexical entries or rules, since these are also represented as fss. In the lkb, psorts may be combined using either ordinary uni cation or default uni cation, the latter giving default inheritance (Copestake et al., in press) . In this case the fs description may specify information which con icts with that of the psort and which will override it.
For ease of comparison with other untyped systems, the examples which follow are based on the use of inheritance via the psort mechanism, rather than the type mechanism. We will simply assume a most general type lex-sign which will constrain all the fss representing lexical signs to have the three features orth, syn and sem. Thus, if we specify the hierarchy of psorts illustrated in Figure 1 , Past-Verb and Irreg-Past-Verb introduce incompatible values for the feature suffix so that fss for verbs in the latter class will not be subsumed by those for There are clearly some infelicities in this approach, since we are forced to associate one and only one type of fs with each type or psort and therefore cannot capture the morphological relationships between in ectional variants of a verb. For this reason, the lkb includes a notion of lexical rule which can encode essentially arbitrary mappings between fss, and it would be more natural to treat past participle formation as a rule of this type. One possible treatment is shown in Figure 2 . Here the in ectional variants are generated by rule application but we need to introduce a new feature morph on lexical signs, in order to specify the appropriate irregular forms. We also must ensure that only the correct rules apply and this is done by typing the stem values as either regular or irregular. Verb, by default, speci es that the value of horthihstemi has to be a subtype of regular, but this is overridden by the psort A lexical rule of past participle formation, shown in Figure 2 , maps regular base verbs to regular past participle forms. In the lkb, lexical rules are themselves fss, and thus can be treated as psorts and inherit information from each other, thus the lexical rule for irregular su xation default inherits from the standard rule. A lexical rule is applicable to a fs if its input half, that is the section of the lexical rule found by following the path h1i, is uni able with that fs. The result of lexical rule application is indicated by the path h0i. In Figure 2 , we assume that unspeci ed parts of the fs are the same in the input and output. Thus the e ect of the rule Past formation is to add the su x ed and to change the value of hsynihvformi. The lexical entry for walk simply inherits from Verb and sleep inherits from Irregbase. The regular lexical rule applies to walk but the irregular one does not, because the types regular and irregular are disjoint. Note that we have to explicitly specify the stem of walk as regular to avoid the incorrect lexical rule applying. In order to allow the regular past participle form of dream to be produced, we have to ensure that both lexical rules can apply, and we do this by specifying that the value for horthihstemi for the psort Dualpast is the type reg/irreg which subsumes both regular and irreg. Thus dream has both an irregular su x and a regular one. 4 Although this approach is better than the rst, it is still far from perfect. The lexical rule is not directly blocked by the existence of a`competing' form, instead we have associated the existence of the irregular form with a class which also speci es that the stem is irregular, and it is this speci cation that blocks the application of the lexical rule. This, in turn, is overridden for dual class verbs such as dream. Thus we have made blocking non-absolute at the cost of increasing the complexity of the representation. A third option is to give the su xes themselves lexical entries which are combined with the base forms in more or less the same way as word forms are combined in the grammar. This approach however su ers from much the same problem with respect to blocking. In contrast to the lkb, elu and datr represent in ectional paradigms by inheritance, without introducing the concept of a lexical rule. elu makes use of a variant set mechanism which causes a verbal class or paradigm to generate separate fss for each in ectional variant. Constraints on fss are speci ed as path equations and hierarchical class membership is used to enforce default inheritance so that blocking is absolute whenever a subclass introduces a constraint which clashes with that introduced by a superclass. Therefore, Russell et al. (1991) introduce a separate class of dual past verbs and treat dream as a member of both this and the regular class. A slight variant of their analysis is reproduced in Figure 3 . 5 Vertical bars separating constraints indicate elu variant sets, that is, disjunctive constraints on (distinct) fss. The empty variant set in Dual-past allows dream to inherit all the information from Verb as well as the variant speci ed by Dual-past. The order of inheritance in this example is dependent on textual order | that is dream inherits rst from Dual-past and then from Verb. An equivalent approach would be to make Dual-past inherit from Verb. This would be slightly more elegant, because it would remove the need to specify that the lexical entries inherited from two classes, and avoid the dependency on textual order. However, in both cases the same form of redundancy is present in the analysis as in the lkb description considered above: the irregular past speci cation has been made in several parts of the lexical description in order to circumvent the absolute e ects of blocking.
datr (Evans & Gazdar, 1989 ) also employs a notion of hierarchical class membership to specify lexical entries and to control default inheritance. However, unlike the lkb and elu, datr is a language which is intended to be speci c to lexical representation and to be usable by any grammar which can be encoded in terms of attributes and values. datr does not specify or manipulate fss directly | datr queries result in the values of paths at particular nodes being returned. There are essentially two components | a monotonic component which explicitly speci ed values for paths and a nonmonotonic operation of path closure which can intuitively be thought of as` lling in the gaps' to give values for all node/path pairs not de ned in the theory. However, despite the di erences between datr and the other theories, similar redundancy arises as in the analyses sketched above when we attempt to account in a straightforward way for alternative forms such as dreamed and dreamt, since the speci cation of a value for a node blocks any alternative inherited value.
To summarise, the inelegancy and redundancy in these descriptions arises from the fact that each is forced to treat blocking as an absolute constraint enforced via default inheritance.
The undesirable e ects of this are circumvented by introducing additional classes which are otherwise unmotivated. Less restricted approaches such as those of Daelemans (1987 ) or de Smedt (1984 might, in principle, be able to use additional object-oriented techniques to achieve a less redundant lexical description, by allowing the option of accumulating rather than overriding inherited information, for example. However, this is di cult to evaluate in view of the open-ended nature of these techniques. Furthermore, it is far from clear that any inheritance based treatment of blocking can allow for the examples discussed in the previous section where the lexical item responsible for the blocking of the productive process is morphologically unrelated (e.g. stealer/thief, pig/pork). This would imply that we would have to structure the lexicon so that, for example, thief was related to steal by some form of the process of +er nominalisation. Clearly there is some semantic relationship, but requiring that a relationship between the lexical items as a whole be speci ed directly as though it were a variant of the productive process is very unappealing.
A New Framework
In this section, we outline a novel approach to lexical description in which we utilise a default logic as a constraint language on possible lexical entries speci ed as fss. (For a detailed description of constraint-based languages in linguistic description, see Shieber (1992) .) Within this framework we believe that it is possible to characterise blocking more satisfactorily. The default logic that we utilise is the propositional variant of Commonsense Entailment (ce, Asher & Morreau, 1991) . This logic is appropriate because we can encode fss using nominal modal propositional logic (Blackburn, 1992a,b) ; ce supports the patterns of default reasoning required to characterise blocking; and the propositional variant is decidable which is one crucial (and minimal) requirement for a theory of lexical description. Blackburn (1992a,b) demonstrates that attribute value structures expressed as directed graphs are, in e ect, languages of propositional modal logic in which attributes are modal operators and values are propositional variables. Furthermore, he proves that the subset of attribute value structures that can be expressed as directed acyclic graphs (dags) incorporating reentrancy are characterised by the nominal propositional modal logic (npl). This is a modal logic augmented with an atomic propositional variable sort called nominals, where a nominal is constrained to be true on a unique node. Blackburn (1992b) discusses why modal logics are particularly natural ways of describing FSs. In e ect, the standard notations for describing FSs, such as AVMs, assume an internal view: than describing what happens at arbitrary nodes, the graph structure is described in terms of transitions from some particular node. Shieber, 1986) .
A Language for describing FSs
In what follows, we develop a theory in which lexical signs are encoded as fss; that is dags incorporating re-entrancy. And we utilise a notational variant of npl to describe fss. An example of a lexical entry represented as a fs in avm notation is given in Figure 4 . We will mostly refer to such fss as lexical signs and assume that all such signs are minimally speci ed for orth, syn and sem (e.g. Pollard & Sag, 1987) .
Descriptions in npl can be partial in the sense that more than one fs may satisfy a set of npl formulas; we will use a sorted version of npl, in order to achieve the required ne-grainedness of descriptions, in which a partial speci city ordering induces a lattice over propositional variables from which we can derive a subsumption relation (Mellish, 1988) . The minimal model which satis es a lexical description will correspond to the set of well-formed fss or lexical signs according to that description. The sortal axioms in (1) de ne some useful sorts and values for verbal features.
( 1) A partial description of the class of fss that we have been assuming for verbs is given in (2).
(2) hsyni(hcati(verb)^hvformi(vform))^horthihstemi(vstem) Modal operators representing attributes are written in upper case between angle brackets, propositional variables are lower case, and round brackets, delimiting the scope of operators, are mostly suppressed where this is unambiguous. This description is satis ed by any of the fss containing values for cat, vform and stem subsumed by the propositional variables `verb',`vform' and`vstem', such as that in Figure 4 . We can de ne the closure of a lexical description as the set of fss which satisfy all theorems of that description. An algorithm for computing (membership of) this set can be de ned in terms of substitutions of atomic propositional variables (such as`verb' in the sort system de ned in (1)) guided by the subsumption relation. Whether the closure of a lexical description remains nite will depend, rstly, on the niteness of the sort system and, secondly, on the manner in which we restrict the inference mechanisms available via the constraint language.
In general, to properly constrain the set of lexical signs compatible with a description, it will be necessary to specify re-entrancy or structure sharing within and between lexical signs. Blackburn (1992a) uses nominals, denoted by alphabetical indices, to describe re-entrant fss. Thus, the fs in Figure 4 speci es that arg1 of the predicate`sleep' is the same as the value of sem under subj. A constraint enforcing this equivalence is given in (3).
(3) hsemiharg1i(i)^hsynihsubjihsemi(i) We will use npl to model the lexicon as a whole, including the relationships between individual lexical signs. We will employ a notion of lexical rule similar to that presented in Pollard & Sag (1987:209f) in which such rules are treated as conditional assertions relating one (basic) lexical sign to another (derived) lexical sign. (This notion of lexical rule is essentially equivalent in expressive power to that utilised in the lkb, allowing arbitrary relationships between fss to be speci ed.) We represent this in terms of a structure where derived signs fan out' from the basic signs, using a conventionally-named set of modal operators, LR1, LR2 . . . LRn, in order to denote the transitions described by the di erent lexical rules. In npl, we can express the fact that conjunctive constraints must hold for a single lexical sign by naming the superordinate node in the dag corresponding to the appropriate fs. For example, (4) illustrates a simple lexical rule for past participle formation expressed in npl: here i, j and k are metavariables ranging over nominals. Models corresponding to descriptions which include lexical rules may include more than one fs to which the rule has been applied.
In this framework, we are treating lexical rules as constraints on connected FSs containing one basic and further derived lexical entries connected by a distinguished attribute naming the relevant rule. This notation is verbose, so we will represent lexical rules using more familiar avm notation in which boxed values translate as nominals and standard avm formatting conventions are used to indicate the scope of modal operators, conjunction, and so forth (Blackburn, 1992a) . Rather than explicitly indicating the conventional modal operators, LR1 etc, we will use the syntax ! LR1 etc to indicate that the implied feature structure is connected by an LR operator. We will also omit the explicit speci cation of the outermost nominal (i) in the AVM diagrams; thus (4) will become (5). 
Default Logic as a Constraint Language
The lexical rule of past participle formation in (5) is far too strong since it does not hold of all (English) verbs and would therefore produce many linguistically unmotivated fss. The approach taken in theories of lexical description based on default inheritance is, rstly, to restrict the domain of application of such a constraint to a subclass of verbs and, secondly, to allow the constraint to be overridden on stipulated further sub-classes or cases. We can restrict the application of a rule such as (5) to an appropriate subclass via the sort system and we can express its default nature by relaxing ! to default implication (>), as in (6) ( > is to be read as If then by default, ). Default logics incorporate a rule of defeasible modus ponens (DMP: > ; j , where j stands for nonmonotonic validity) which ensures that within the class of verbs vstem, (6) will apply unless the result is inconsistent with the premises. We cannot, though, prevent the application of (6) to irregular verbs merely by adding the more speci c rule in (7). This is because as things stand, there is no statement in the premises asserting that the consequents of (6) and (7) don't usually both hold in any given knowledge base (kb). So no inconsistency arises through the application of DMP to both (6) and (7) (which we can represent schematically as > ; > ; ; j ; ). Therefore, as the system stands we do not incorporate blocking. And, in fact, this is the result that we want because, although we intuitively understand these values for suffix to be in con ict, the existence of forms such as dreamed and dreamt tells us that we do not want this con ict to be as strong as logical inconsistency. In order to create a con ict, we can include a further constraint (8), which represents the e ect of blocking in irregular past participle formation.
(
(8) captures the intuition that the suffixs +t and +ed are usually, but not always, in con ict. The motivation for including (8) is to override the default application of (6) in appropriate circumstances. In fact, this is an inference that will not follow in all theories of default logic. However, we postpone detailed discussion of the precise theory of nonmonotonic reasoning required to validate the desired patterns of reasoning until x4.4. In addition, we want irregular past participle formation to continue to apply. The (minimal) pattern of reasoning required is thus schematised in (9). 
Unblocking
The fact that speci c blocking rules, such as (8), are defaults can be exploited to develop a more elegant and conceptually clearer account of`unblocking', where`competing' rules do both re. In the case of dual past verbs, such as dream, given the sort system de ned in (5) the dual past class of verbs are subsumed by the class of irregular verbs. Therefore, these verbs will be treated like sleep with respect to past participle formation. In order to unblock regular past participle formation for these verbs we can override the blocking default by explicitly adding the assertion that dual past verbs are exceptional in that they tolerate both regular and irregular past participle forms. This information is represented in (10).
(10) hLR2i(horthi(hstemi(dualvstem)^hsuffixi(+t))) ! hLR1i(horthi(hsuffixi(+ed)))) By adding (10), we introduce an indefeasible assertion concerning dual class verbs' orthographic forms which will override the blocking default rule of (8), since indefeasible information always has priority over defeasible information (this is supported in all nonmonotonic logics). The schematic pattern of inference involves the addition of the subsumption relation and (10) to the pattern given in (9) above, as (11) The unblocking constraint is represented in (11d) and will prevent application of the blocking default in (11c), thus both (11a) and (11b) will apply to dual class verbs. So far, we have developed an account in which dual past verbs can be represented as a subclass of irregular verbs and the regular and irregular rules of past participle formation need only be stated once.
Choosing a Suitable Logic
We have proposed that to account for blocking, the statements about con ict among feature values must be defeasible. This had rami cations on the inferences we need to validate, and hence on the kind of logic that will be suitable. In this section, we introduce a logic for defeasible reasoning called commonsense entailment (or ce) (Asher and Morreau, 1991) , and argue that for our purposes it has certain features that make it more attractive than other candidate logics. In particular, we'll suggest that ce's logical consequence relation supports the patterns of inference (9) and (11) (e.g., birds y, penguins don't y, penguins are birds, Tweety is a penguin j Tweety doesn't y.)
The Nixon Diamond: > ; > : ; ; j = (and j = : ) (e.g., Quakers are paci cists, Republicans are non-paci sts, Nixon is a Quaker and Republican j = Nixon is a paci st, and j = Nixon is a non-paci st.) Defeasible Modus Ponens captures the intuition that one can infer the consequent of a default rule if it is consistent with what is already known. The Penguin Principle contains two con icting default rules in the premises, in that the consequents of both laws cannot hold in a consistent knowledge base (kb). The antecedents of these rules are logically related because entails ; in this sense > : is more speci c than > . The Penguin Principle therefore captures the intuition that one prefers speci c defaults to general ones when they con ict. The Nixon Diamond is like the Penguin Principle in that two con icting default laws apply. However it di ers in that these default laws do not stand in a relation of speci city to each other. ce is a logic where no conclusion is drawn under these circumstances without further information. In other words, it supports the intuition that con ict among default laws is irresolvable when they're unrelated.
The way ce is set up gives at least two advantages over other logics for defeasible reasoning. First, it splits the monotonic component of the theory from the nonmonotonic component, and this can, on occasion, prove conceptually useful when the premises form complex logical structures. Second, unlike Hierarchical Autoepistemic Logic (Konolige, 1988) and Prioritised Circumscription (McCarthy, 1980; Lifschitz, 1984) , it captures the Penguin Principle without the intervention of a device which is extraneous to the semantic machinery. We nd this latter property of ce attractive, since intuitively, whatever kind of reasoning default reasoning is, that more speci c information takes precedence is intrinsic to it and so should be captured in the semantics of defaults.
We will shortly give a brief description of the way the dynamic partial theory of belief supports nonmonotonic patterns of inference, and in particular how it supports the inferences (9) and (11). But rst, we consider the truth conditional component of the theory In words, this says that If then normally is true with respect to a model M at a possible world w if the set of worlds that de nes what is normally the case when is true in w all contain the information that is also true. Thus ce is a conditional logic in the Acqvist (1972) tradition; it di ers from previous conditional logics in the constraints it puts on .
There are two constraints: the rst is Facticity, which intuitively states that however few propositions normally hold when p is the case, one of them is p. = s otherwise Or to put it another way, if it is consistent in s to assume that is normal (and therefore by Facticity it is also consistent to assume is true), then N(s; ) eliminates all those worlds from s where is true but abnormal. So normalisation is the process where one revises the information state to include the assumption that is as normal as possible, given what is already known. Pictorially, we can represent the e ect of normalisation as in Figure 5 , where the shaded areas de ne the value of N(s; ).
Suppose one knows the premises ?. Then from the normalisation function, one can build a normalisation chain for ?. First, one orders the antecedents of the default rules in ? into a sequence . One then builds the normalisation chain by repeated applications of N: one applies N to the current information state and the rst element in ; then one applies N to the result of this rst application of N, and the second element in ; and so on until one reaches a xed point (such a point will be reached since N is non-increasing). In order to see what nonmonotonically follows from the premises ?, one starts with the information state .
. + ?, where .
. is the information state containing nothing but the laws of logic, and one sees what holds in all the xed points of all the normalisation chains for all possible enumerations . 6 In propositional ce, j= and j are both sound, complete and decidable (see Lascarides and Asher, in press ). 6 .
. is de ned to be the set of worlds in the canonical model, that's used to prove completeness of j=. Since this corresponds to knowing nothing but the laws of logic, .
. +? corresponds to knowing nothing but ? and the laws of logic.
To clarify this, let's see informally how , + and N interact to ensure that j supports The Penguin Principle. Let ? = f > ; > : ; ! ; g (i.e., the premises of a Penguin Principle). Then there are essentially two possible enumerations 1 and 2 , where in the former we normalise on rst and then on , and in the latter we normalise on rst and then . Consider the normalisation chain for 1 . We must rst calculate the value of the function N( . ] ], there are no worlds in s where is normal. This situation is depicted in Figure 7 : the second clause in the de nition of N applies. Therefore s 0 = s, and so it also supports : . Since N is non-increasing, it should be clear that : will be in the xed point of this normalisation chain. Now consider the enumeration 2 . We must rst work out the value of N( . . So this normalisation chain also supports : in its xed point. From this brief sketch, one can intuitively see that j supports the Penguin Principle, since : holds in all xed points of all normalisation chains. What's more, it has done so without having to assume a particular order of application of the default rules. This is in sharp contrast to hael and Prioritised Circumscription. In these logics, one must constrain the reasoning process so that one applies the more speci c default rule rst, which then blocks applying the second more general rule.
The advantages of having speci city baked into the semantics of default statements really come into their own when one considers the pattern of inference in (12), which we claim underlies blocking. To see this, we will indicate how ce supports (12), and then brie y consider how hael and prioritised circumscription would deal with it. Let the premises in (12) In fact, using a similar line of reasoning, the other four normalisation chains lead to xed points that all support ls (the details are omitted for reasons of space). So the following also holds, as we require: ? j ls Hence the pattern of inference (12), which underlies lexical blocking, is supported in ce. So ce provides a suitable default logic with which to formalise the constraint language.
There are other candidate logics for defeasible reasoning, so why choose ce? Let's assess how the other logics deal with (12). A few comments about the logical structure of (12) will help clarify the discussion. The default rule (12a) is more speci c than (12b) because of (12d). Furthermore, because of (12c), the consequents of these rules con ict by default. The inference in (12) resolves this con ict in favour of the more speci c rule. So a logic will be adequate for our purposes only if it has the means to resolve con ict. Not all logics for defeasible reasoning have this facility; for example, Reiter's (1980) default logic, autoepistemic logic (Moore 1984) and circumscription (McCarthy 1980) . There are at least two logics apart from ce that have the facility to resolve con ict among defeasible rules: hael, and prioritised circumscription. As we've mentioned, these logics resolve the con ict by constraining the reasoning processes with machinery that is extraneous to the semantics of default statements.
hael is an extension of autoepistemic logic motivated in part by the need to validate the Penguin Principle. An autoepistemic logic is a theory of kb extension: if the consequent of a default law is consistent with the rest of the contents of the kb, then it is added to that kb. In hael, certain kb expansions are preferred on the basis that the defaults used in them have a higher priority in some well-de ned sense than the ones used in the alternative expansions. Informally, the contents of a kb are structured into a hierarchy. The information at each level in the hierarchy represents di erent sources of information available to an agent, while the hierarchy expresses the way in which this information is combined. Facts and indefeasible laws are placed at the rst level, and more speci c default laws are placed at a lower level in the hierarchy than less speci c default laws; the way the logic works ensures that information at level n has priority over information at level m where n < m; in other words the e ects of default laws at lower levels in the hierarchy can block the action of more general defaults, placed higher in the hierarchy. The only constraint on the hierarchy is that more speci c defaults must be at a lower level. Since (12b) and (12c) have unrelated antecedents, they can appear in any relative order in the hierarchy, even though they con ict. This proves problematic, if we wish to support (12) in hael. For suppose we put (12b) at a lower level in the hierarchy than (12c). This means that in the kb extension, (12b) will have priority over (12c). Hence ls will follow from the premises (12a-e), contrary to our requirements. To avoid this undesirable result, we would have to constrain the way we construct the hierarchy, in order to ensure that (12c) is always placed at a lower level than (12b), (if they're at the same level, we would in fact still infer ls ). But this has serious rami cations on the translation process of default statements into the object language. We would be committed to constraining the hierarchy in this case so that two defaults with logically unrelated antecedents appear in a particular order. But it is not always the case that we wish to constrain the order of two such defaults (cf. the premises of a Nixon Diamond). So we have sacri ced the means to translate default statements into the logic in a uniform way.
A similar problem arises in prioritised circumscription, where the abnormality predicates are ordered into a hierarchy, and one prefers models that satisfy the premises and which minimise on abnormality predicates higher in the hierarchy than those lower down. Again, we would have to be careful about the order in which we place the abnormality predicates associated with the default rules (12b) and (12c), if the logic is to capture the pattern of inference we need to do blocking. Again, we would fail to supply a uniform translation of default statements into the formal language. By contrast, our formalisation of blocking in ce captures the pattern of inference we need, while at the same time maintaining a uniform translation of default statements into the object language. This is desirable because it allows for a more direct, perspicuous and elegant encoding of lexical rules and other constraints without the need to impose any external, linguistically-unmotivated ordering.
5 Blocking { A Uni ed Phenomenon?
The account we have developed would be unsatisfactory if we were unable to derive any general principle of blocking, since intuitively the same principle is involved in many other examples including those cited in x2. We argue that speci c blocking defaults, such as that for irregular past verbs, follow from an indefeasible rule which can express a version of`preemption by synonymy' restricted via the subsumption relation. This rule enforces the principle that, if there are two lexical rules which validate derived signs with equivalent syn and sem components but distinct orth components, and the antecedents of these rules stand in a subsumption relation, then a blocking default is validated negating the derived orthography of the more general rule. We express the rst version of the blocking principle as a deductive propositional schema; that is, as a`metalevel' indefeasible implication over lexical descriptions, in (13). 7 The schema in (13a) represents any two lexical rules, and (13b) states that there must be an (indirect) unidirectional subsumption relation between the antecedents of these rules (inferrable from the sort system). (13c) states that these rules must result in derived lexical signs with equivalent values for syn and sem and distinct values for orth. If the conditions expressed in the antecedent of (13) are met the principle validates the deduction of a speci c blocking default negating the orthography of the more general derived rule. This deduction takes place in the monotonic component of the constraint language (since it is an indefeasible implication). Hence if (12a,b,d) are veri ed, the default statement (12c) of con ict is inferred before normalisation starts. And as we saw in x4.4, the nonmonotonic component can use this default statement of con ict to achieve the desired e ect of blocking. Moreover, it's important to stress that the statement of con ict is a default; so even if its antecedent is veri ed by the kb, its e ects can be overridden by indefeasible unblocking assertions of the form o^ o (as in the case of the dual class verbs in x4.3).
The blocking principle in (13) is adequate to generate the blocking default required to prevent *sleeped discussed in x4.2 and many others. The case of +ness and +ity, introduced in x2, can be treated in a manner analogous to past participle formation, since we have two lexical rules which clearly stand in a subsumption relation and generate di ering forms with the same syntax (and meaning). However, an account of the curious, curiosity; glorious, glory, *gloriousity case cannot be obtained for the blocking principle as stated in (13) because we require the blocking of a (derivational) morphological rule in the presence of an underived synonymous but orthographically distinct lexical sign. A similar situation obtains with the rule of`animal grinding' sense extension or conversion which produces the meat reading of lamb, and so forth, but is blocked in the case of pig by pork. In these cases, it appears that we must state that`preemption by synonymy' also occurs when a non rule-generated synonymous word exists. We will concentrate on developing an account of the blocking of animal grinding, since this putative lexical rule has motivated much of our interest in blocking . We can recast the rules of grinding and animal grinding as lexical rules, as in (14a,b). We assume that the class of`animals' is subsumed by the class of`ind(ividuated) obj(ects)', that (14a) is an indefeasible rule, and that (14b) applies by default to further specify the interpretation of grinding applied to animals (see for a more detailed justi cation of this analysis, explication of origin, and so forth). In order to not generate this more speci ed meaning for pig, by default, we must express the manner in which pork takes precedence over pig. As it stands the blocking principle apparently states that blocking applies when two lexical rules are involved, but in this case blocking is caused by the presence of an underived lexical sign (standing in the same general relationship to the derived sign). But the underived sign does not stand in a subsumption relation to either sign in the lexical rule. Intuitively, though the underived sign is more`reliable' than the derived one because it represents a fact, rather than a (nonmonotonic) inference. We can incorporate this intuition into the blocking principle without modi cation, given that we use ce, because the axioms of ce in (15a,b) allow us to make this pattern of inference parallel to the earlier case. ) ) If (16a) represents animal grinding then application of this rule to pig will produce a lexical sign which stands in the relation to pork (i.e., ls ) de ned by (16d), and the formulas of (16) together will instantiate the blocking principle given in (13). Therefore, we will derive the speci c blocking default that we require to prevent animal grinding validating pig, meaning meat; schematically, o > : o ; and the application of animal grinding in this case will be blocked because the premises will be analogous to the case of irregular past participle formation in x4.2. Thus, these axioms allow us to formalise the similarity between these two examples of blocking without stating that pork is subsumed by pig (meat), as we would have been forced to do in a purely inheritance based account.
The type of blocking which is occurring in the case of words such as sticker or banker is apparently rather di erent to`preemption by synonymy'. In these cases, a di erent meaning for an orthographically identical form is blocked. Ostler & Atkins (1991) refer to this as lexical preemption'. Nevertheless, the pattern of inference required to block the derived, productive sign resulting from +er nominalisation is very similar to the cases of semantic preemption we have considered. We assume that the non-productive meaning of forms such as sticker means that underived lexical signs are present expressing such senses. Application of +er nominalisation will be blocked by a speci c blocking default which asserts that thè more reliable' monotonically derivable semantics of the basic sign for sticker negates the productive default semantics produced by the rule. In (17) we give a (simpli ed) rule of +er nominalisation.
The symmetry between the two versions of the blocking principle, encoding the conditions of semantic and lexical pre-emption mean that it is possible to merge the two principles into one schematic blocking principle, which illustrates more clearly the similarities between the two subcases. (20) Clauses c) { e) express two subcases: for preemption, syntactic identity is always required, x and y are variables ranging over sem and orth. If x is instantiated to sem and y to orth, we have semantic preemption, otherwise we have lexical preemption.
We've seen how a general blocking principle can be encoded in our constraint language. It is interesting to note that such a principle wouldn't have the desired e ect in hael. This is because in hael, the default information is`drip-fed' into the reasoning process as one climbs the hierarchy. (20) will be known from the start (i.e., at level 0) since it is indefeasible knowledge, but its antecedent won't be veri ed until the reasoning process reaches the level where the general default ls > ls is introduced. Therefore, given the way hael works, the consequents of both (20) and this general default will be inferred at the next level in the hierarchy. Consequently, the blocking default is eventually inferred, but it is too late, because ls has also been inferred: the blocking principle has failed to block it. Here, we see another advantage in the way ce is set up. In contrast to hael, all the defeasible information is known from the start of the reasoning process, and all monotonic inferences are carried out before the nonmonotonic ones.
(Un)Blocking and Interactions with Interpretation
A major motivation for developing a default account of blocking was to provide an account of interactions during interpretation, which would allow, say, pig to have the meaning of meat in an appropriate context; for example, I ate pig last night in this awful restaurant. In the extant theories of lexical organisation which we have considered in x3, there is no way of blocking the application of animal grinding to a form such as pig deriving a meaning synonymous with pork. In addition, in those theories, if it were possible to block pig meaning meat via the existence of the underived form pork, then there would be no way of unblocking it; just as in those theories there is no way of unblocking dreamed in a manner which also captures the intuition that dreamed is a subclass of the irregular past participle formation verbs.
A full account of the unblocking of animal grinding is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we can illustrate the approach that might be taken within this framework with respect to the blocked form *sleeped. In a context where a ( rst or second) language learner utters, say, I sleeped well, it seems plausible that listeners infer an unblocking default`online'. The problem is: why do we interpret sleeped as the past participle of sleep in this case? Intuitively, one recognises that the more general default for constructing past participle verb forms applies. One can express this intuition declaratively in ce plus npl. Let ? be (21a-e);
i.e., the premises of the inference that enables us to infer that the past participle form of sleep is slept. We formalise the e ect of the utterance of sleeped as adding 3 o to these premises. The possibility operator has the e ect that we are asserting that o (i.e., the orthography \sleeped")
is true at some node in the feature structure, since 3 o means that o is true at some node, but not necessarily the current one. Then the embedded default in (22) captures the intuition that, upon learning that o must hold at some node (through the utterance of sleeped), one assumes that by default, the consequent of the more general default rule holds and thus o is true as the value of the orthography for ls .
(22) (?^3 o ) > ls So, suppose the kb veri es ? and 3 o . Then (22) is the most speci c default that applies.
So by the Penguin Principle its consequent is inferred. This means that in the case of hearing sleeped, one infers that it is to be interpreted as the past participle form of sleep. Our use of a default logic incorporating a dynamic theory of belief guarantees us intertranslatibility between the constraint language we use to describe the lexicon and the logic in which we characterise processes of interpretation (e.g. Lascarides & Asher, in press ). This enables us to elegantly capture such interactions by seemlessly extending the lexical kb into the more general modular, but interacting kb underlying language interpretation. In addition, the fact that we model the inference underlying the interpretation of sleeped using an embedded default has rami cations on the kind of logic that can account for these phenomena. Embedded defaults are syntactically ill-formed in hael and default logic, but well-formed in circumscription and ce.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that it is possible to derive a default account of blocking. This account is more compatible with linguistic facts. By representing con ict among feature values as default statements, we were able to support inferences that underly blocking without making blocking an absolute principle of lexical organisation. This paves the way for more insightful accounts of the status of words, such as pig meaning meat, ?curiousness, and so forth. In this paper, we have sketched preliminary accounts of a few of these cases in the logic ce, and argued that this is a more appropriate for this application. In addition we have argued that our approach provides a basis for characterising interactions between lexical and wider interpretative principles.
Much work remains to be done: we think that the approach could be improved by being recast within a typed framework (Carpenter 1992 ) which would disallow arbitrary extensions of feature structures. Within such a treatment the notion of lexical rule could be constrained: here we have assumed an arbitrary mapping between feature structures is possible, but we would like to limit this to monotonic operations plus restricted mappings between particular types in the hierarchy. In general the computational complexity and consequent tractability of this approach needs to be investigated. We intend to explore the applicability of this approach to other examples of blocking; and to examine interactions between lexical blocking and other knowledge resources used in interpretation.
